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THE EC PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE GATTI 
ENVIRONMENT INTERFACE 
BOB KAPANENt 
There has to be a dear recognition in the GA TT of the 
importance of the international environmental agenda, 
which ensures a mutually supportive relationship between 
the GATT and multilateral environmental agreements. 
European Community (EC) Proposal 
on Trade and the Environment. I 
The interface between trade and environmental protection is vast 
and interesting, and will inevitably be the focus of much debate in 
the next few years as nations address the issue of how international 
environmental agreements containing trade sanctions ought to in-
teract with global trade policies. 
While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (GATT)3 
does not govern or regulate trade directly, it does regulate the 
statutory and administrative rules which restrict or distort trade be-
tween GATT contracting parties. Environmental agreements con-
taining trade sanctions which restrict or distort trade, will thereby 
be vulnerable to challenges from GA TT contracting parties on the 
grounds that they violate trade provisions under GATT. 
This note focuses on the fact that present and future multilateral 
environmental agreements may be found GATT-inconsistent due to 
t B. Arts & Sc. (McMaster), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). 
1 "EC Proposal on Trade and Environment" Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report 
(27 November 1992) S-3 [hereinafter "EC Proposal"]. 
2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents, vol. III (Geneva: GAIT, 1958), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
3 As a brief history, GATT was created in 1947, as part of the post-World War 
II international economic restructuring. The United Nations, World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund were also created at this time. There are 111 con-
tracting parties to the GA TT, and additional countries abide by its terms. 
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their restraints on trade. At present, the status of environmental 
agreements is unclear because, while there are GATT decisions 
illustrating how unilateral trade actions with environmental purposes 
will be treated by GA TT, there are as yet no GA TT Panel decisions 
on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to indicate how 
they will be treated. 4 Given the present interpretation of 
environmental exceptions under GATT, however, a strong argument 
may be made that MEAs would likely be found GATT-inconsistent.5 
The EC has therefore proposed a collective interpretation of a 
GATT clause that would clarify the status of MEAs under GATT. 
This note argues that the European Community's proposed 
collective interpretation presents a unique opportunity for GA TT 
contracting parties to codify support for MEAs, and provide guid-
ance in avoiding GATT-inconsistencies in future MEAs. Most impor-
tantly, GATT contracting parties have an opportunity to ensure that 
the overly restrictive criteria established in previous GATT Panel 
decisions, regarding unilateral environmental actions, are not ap-
plied to MEAs. 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
The GATT Group on Environmental Measures and International 
Trade found that of the 127 multilateral agreements concerning the 
environment, 17 of them have trade provisions. 6 The three most 
significant of these are the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora7 , the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Basel 
Convention.9 
4 The EC makes the odd statement that "[t]he legitimacy of trade measures taken 
pursuant to [an MEA] has not been questioned in the GATI ." "EC Proposal," supra 
note 1 at S-3. Does the EC mean to imply that MEAs will not be questioned-that 
they are immune to GATI challenges? While it is true that no contracting parties 
have dared to challenge an MEA, that does not imply that such a challenge could 
not be brought. 
5 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text. 
6 GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 (13 
February 1992) at 10. 
7 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, 3March1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085. 
8 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal See also Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529; Amendment 
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The EC proposes, upon examination of these three MEAs, "[that] 
the rationale for trade measures has been to ensure the effective 
implementation of commitments to protect the environment"10 and 
to ensure that environmental commitments established in MEAs 
would not be undermined or nullified by actions of non-parties to 
the MEA. 
GATT Article XX 
GA TT does not specifically refer to the environment. 11 The most 
relevant measures, regarding environmental policies, are the 
"General Exceptions" provisions of article XX of GATT. 
The article XX exception "applies only to measures inconsistent 
with another provision of the General Agreement." 12 Article XX(b) 
provides an exception for measures "necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health."13 Article XX(g) provides an excep-
tion for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 14 These 
measures are permissible so long as they do not "constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction of interna-
tional trade."15 These two article XX provisions allow for environ-
mental exceptions to be made for otherwise GATT-inconsistent 
trade policies. 
GATT Panels have interpreted the two environmental exception 
prov1s1ons in GA TT challenges to unilateral trade actions. 
Challenges against unilateral trade actions have been highly 
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 June 1990, 
S.M.T. 2:316. 
9 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657. 
IO "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-3. 
11 Protection of the environment is not specifically stated in art. XX for 
historical reasons, and it is felt by the EC that the "public policy objectives 
reflected in XX(b) and XX(g) are broad enough to encompass the objectives of 
environmental protection." "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-4. 
12 GA TT Panel Report, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GA TT Doc. 
365/345 (7 November 1989) [hereinafter Section 337] at 50, para. 5.9. 
13 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX. 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
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successful. At present, there are no compelling reasons why a GATT 
challenge brought against the trade restrictions imposed under an 
MEA would be treated differently from a GATT challenge against 
unilateral trade actions. Concern for the status of MEAs is thus 
warranted. The collective interpretation of article XX ought to 
define a new test for MEAs, or else international efforts directed at 
establishing and maintaining MEAs will be frustrated by individual 
nations pursuing complaints under GATT. 
Growing Support for MEAs 
In the past few decades, nations dissatisfied with 
extrajurisdictional environmental regulation will either attempt to 
negotiate an MEA with other nations, addressing the problem, or 
they will attempt to impose standards unilaterally, which generally 
materialize in the form of non-tariff trade measures. 
At present there exists a broad consensus 16 among GATT con-
tracting parties that international environmental problems should be 
addressed by means of MEAs.17 It is ironic therefore that existing 
MEAs are presently susceptible to being found GATT-inconsistent. 
16 There also presently exists a dispute between the United States and the 
European Community over the use of unilateral trade actions to address interna-
tional environmental problems. This dispute has had the unfortunate effect of 
delaying any sort of agreement on how the GATT ought to address the trade and 
environment nexus. "GATT Environment Work Delayed by Dispute Over 
Unilateral Action" Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report (13 November 1992) S-1. 
As of October 1993, it is reported that "[t]he U.S. has been alone in the GATT 
in trying to establish a legal basis for a country to impose trade restrictions 
unilaterally to protect the environment beyond its borders" Inside U.S. Trade-
Special Report (15 October 1993) S-1. 
!7 This is indicated in the three non-legally binding agreements adopted at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Two of these 
agreements contain the following passage: 
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges 
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided. Environmental measures addressing international 
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on 
an international consensus. 
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Proceedings 
of the Main Committee; Agenda 21, Chapter 2, Para. 22(i) and c. 39 para. 34. This 
passage was originally taken from paragraph 152 of the Declaration of the 
UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena. See "GATT Document on Earth Summit" Inside 
U.S. Trade-SpecialReport(13 November 1992) S-5, S-6. 
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The Montreal Protocol provides a good example of an MEA be-
ing found GAIT-inconsistent. Parties to the Montreal Protocol have 
agreed to reduce their use and production of ozone-depleting sub-
stances in a series of stages, toward their overall elimination by 
1995. 18 The Montreal Protocol does not contain any restrictions on 
trade between parties, but there are powerful restrictions on trade 
between parties and non-parties, which are quite controversial. 
Parties to GA TT are required to restrict exports in the 
following manner: ban the export of controlled substances to non-
parties; 19 discourage the export to non-parties of "technology for 
producing or for utilizing controlled substances";20 and refrain from 
providing various forms of aid that would support the export of 
such equipment, plants or technology which facilitate the production 
of the controlled substances.21 These measures violate article XI, 
which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.22 
In regards to imports, GATT-parties are to ban progressively 
imports from non-parties of the following items: ozone depleting 
substances23; products which contain these substances;24 and possibly 
products produced with, but not containing, such substances, 
provided that the ban is feasible.25 The underlying rationale for 
these import restrictions is to ensure commitment to reduced do-
mestic consumption, and to ensure that non-parties are not deriving 
economic benefits from their own export of controlled substances.26 
18 Montreal Protocol, supra note 8. The original deadline was the year 2000, 
which was subsequently moved forward. 
19 Ibid. art. 4.2. 
20 Ibid. art. 4.5. 
21 Ibid. art. 4.6. It may be noted that the Montreal Protocol article 4.7 ensures that 
articles 4.5 and 4.6 do not backfire: "Paragraphs 5 and 6 shall not apply co 
products, equipment, plants or technology that improve the containment, 
recovery, recycling, or destruction of controlled substances .... " 
22 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal 
Instruments (Cambridge [Eng.]: Grotius, 1992) at 487 [hereinafter UNCED 
Survey Report]. 
23 Montreal Protoco4 supra note 8, art. 4.1. 
24 Ibid. art. 4.3. 
25 Ibid. art. 4.4. 
26 J. McDonald "Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and 
Environmental Protection in the New World Order" (1993) 23 Envtl. L. 397 at 
451. 
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The import measures violate the most-favoured-nation principle 
because they discriminate against products on the basis of their na-
tional origin. Imports from non-parties are to be progressively 
banned. The import measures also violate the national treatment 
principle because imports are discriminated against based upon 
their production process. Although a domestic product, produced 
without the use of a controlled substance, may be more environ-
mentally friendly than an imported product which is produced us-
ing a controlled substance, they are nonetheless "like products."27 
The import measures also violate article XI, since they impose 
quantitative restrictions on imports.28 
Since these MEA provisions are inconsistent with GATT, the next 
step, in a GATT Panel analysis, would be to assess whether an ex-
emption under GA TT article XX is appropriate. 29 This leaves the 
MEA in a precarious situation, especially since the GATT Panel 
decisions interpreting article XX, as discussed below, would not 
provide an exemption for an MEA such as the Montreal Protocol. A 
viable solution, however, has been offered to solve this dilemma: 
through clarification of the article XX test. 
EC Proposed Solution: Collective Interpretation of Article XX 
To assist in interpreting article XX the EC proposed the creation of 
relevant interpretive materials.3° Specifically, the EC stated that 
"GATT members should interpret Article XX ... to set out clear 
criteria on the use of trade measures to enforce MEAs."31 
The EC emphasized that "article XX must define the circum-
stances under which trade sanctions taken pursuant to an MEA, and 
applied to a GA TT member which did not sign the MEA, can go 
27 These conclusions assume that a trade measure is pursued under article 4.4 of 
the Montreal Protocol and that the Tuna-Dolphin Panel's interpretation of "like 
products" is applied. 
28 UNCED Survey Report, supra note 22 at 487. 
29 Section 337, supra note 12. 
30 The interpretation problem may be addressed through interpretive 
materials. In addition to interpreting the words provided in the General 
Agreement, there are Annexes to the General Agreement which provide 
interpretive materials to various clauses in the GATT. These materials must be 
considered authoritative, and be held to nearly as high a standing as the actual 
GATT dauses. See J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GA TT 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) at 20. 
31 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-1. 
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against other GATT obligations of maintaining an open trading sys-
tem."32 Such an approach appears logical, as it would reduce un-
certainty about how trade measures may be used, and ought to be 
used, under MEAs. There is very broad support for this proposal. 33 
Interpretation of General Exceptions 
Extensive interpretation of the "General Exceptions" is provided by 
the Panel Report in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna34 
The facts,35 decision,36 and net effect37 of this dispute have been 
discussed and criticized extensively in many artides38 and will not 
be discussed in this note. Discussion is warranted, however, on the 
tests that GA TT Panel Decisions have developed in regards to 
unilateral environmental actions. A collateral test ought to be 
developed specifically for MEAs, because the tests applied to 
unilateral trade actions are inappropriate. 
EXTRAJURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION 
In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, the GATT Panel ruled that article XX 
exemptions do not have "extrajurisdictional" application, but may 
32 Ibid. 
33 "GATT Environment Group Postpones Work Until End of Uruguay Round" 
Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report(l5 October 1993) S-1. 
34 GATT Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT 
Doc. DS21/R (3 September 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin]. 
35 The dispute involved import provision of the U.S. Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA). The MMPA bans the importation of fish caught 
using techniques which result in an incidental kill of ocean mammals in excess 
of U.S. practices. In 1990, following a court order, an import ban was imposed on 
yellowfin tuna and tuna products caught by Mexican vessels using purse seine nets 
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. Ibid. 
36 The Panel found that the MMPA import and intermediary restrictions vio-
lated GATT art. III (national treatment) and art. XI (quantitative restrictions). 
37 As Mexico did not want to jeopardize its negotiations of a trade agreement 
with the US, the US administration convinced President Salinas to not seek adop-
tion of the GATT Council Report. 
38 See S. M. Spracker & D. C. Lundsgaard "Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed 
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment" 
(1993) 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 385; Ted L. McDorman "The 1991 U.S.-Mexico 
GATT Panel Report On Tuna and Dolphin: Implications For Trade and 
Environment Conflicts" (1992) 17 N.C. J. Int'! L. & Com. Reg. 461; McDonald, 
supra note 26. 
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only be invoked by a country to protect living organisms or natural 
resources within that country's borders. The Panel stated that the 
intended use of XX(b) is for "sanitary measures to safeguard life or 
health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the 
importing country."39 
The Panel held that the same reasoning applies for article XX(g), 
whereby "[a] country can effectively control the production or con-
sumption of an exhaustible natural resource only to the extent that 
the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction."40 One 
commentator claims that this interpretation is incorrect because the 
resource need only be consumed in the domestic market, as the ex-
ception is phrased as "production or consumption."41 In other words, 
regardless of where the product is produced, if it's being consumed 
domestically then it is within that nation's jurisdiction to control 
it's imports of that exhaustible natural resource. 
The EC Proposal "firmly supports the conclusions of the Tuna 
Panel Report[,] ... " including the rule that "a country should not 
unilaterally restrict imports on the basis of environmental damage 
that does not impact on a country's territory."42 While the collec-
tive interpretation of article XX may support the Tuna-Dolphin de-
cision with respect to unilateral actions, a distinction must be made 
for multilateral actions. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel held that article 
XX exceptions do not have extrajurisdictional application without 
acknowledging that MEAs may have extrajurisdictional application. 
In other words, the Panel held that a nation may only protect the 
territory within its jurisdiction.43 While the collective interpreta-
tion of article XX may condone the Tuna-Dolphin decision, a caveat 
should be made that MEAs with extrajurisdictional application may 
qualify for exemption under article XX despite any contrary im-
pressions, regarding unilateral trade actions, given by the Tuna-
Dolphin Panel. 
Suggestions 
Essentially, the GATT Panel did not want individual contracting 
parties dictating life or health protection policies with which other 
39 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 45, para. 5.26. 
40 Ibid at 47, para. 5.31. 
41 McDonald, supra note 26 at 442. 
42 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-3. 
43 See Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 34, para. 5.26 and at 47, para. 5.31-5.32. 
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contracting parties would have to comply to retain their GATT 
rights. 44 However, the prohibition on extrajurisdictional application 
could pose difficulties for MEAs created to protect the environment 
of entire regions of the globe, much less areas beyond the 
jurisdiction of any one nation. By definition the extrajurisdictional 
test ought not apply to MEAs because MEAs are international in 
scope. Many environmental effects cannot be contained locally, but 
have some impact upon the global ecosystem. Comments by some 
interested third parties support this view.45 The UNCED Survey 
Report argues that extra-territorial application is needed for terri-
torial protection. For example, although the trade provisions of the 
Montreal Protocol apply extrajurisdictionally, one could argue that 
"depletion of the extra-territorial ozone layer is harmful to the 
territorial environment."46 A nation, therefore, has an interest in 
environmental degradation beyond their territory for the sake of 
those extra-territorial regions themselves, and for the sake of spill-
over effects on the nation's own territory. 
NECESSITY 
Article XX(b) only excepts those measures that conflict with other 
GATT provisions if the measures are necessary in order to protect the 
life or health of humans, animals or plants. The collective interpre-
tation of article XX should clarify which trade restrictions are ac-
ceptable under an MEA by specifying the test to be used in assessing 
necessity. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel interpreted necessary narrowly, 
following another Panel Report,47 stating that the objectives of ar-
ticle XX(b) were: 
44 This is consistent with the sovereignty of states doctrine, but it becomes 
more complicated once responsibility for environmental spill-overs is 
considered. 
45 Australia commented that "Controls on trade flows necessary to give effect to 
international conventions ... should be considered as incidental to GATT obli-
gations. However, where a contracting party takes a measure with extraterritorial 
application outside of any international framework of cooperation, it is 
appropriate for the GA TT to scrutinize the measure against that party's 
obligations under the General Agreement." See Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 
26, para. 4.1. 
46 UNCED Survey Report, supra note 22 at 488. 
47 GATT Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DSlO/R (7 November 1990). 
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to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive 
measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to 
pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that 
such inconsistencies were unavoidable [emphasis added]. 48 
Following the reasoning of yet another Panel49, the Tuna-
Dolphin Panel added that the party invoking an article XX exception 
must demonstrate that it has "exhausted all options reasonably avail-
able50 to it to pursue its [objectives] through measures consistent 
with the General Agreement ... " [my emphasis].51 The test adopted 
by the Tuna-Dolphin Panel may be restated as requiring that the 
trade actions were unavoidable, since all other options to achieve the 
environmental objective were exhausted. 
The Section 337 Panel had previously stated that if no GATT-
consistent measure was reasonably available, then the contracting 
party would have to use the measure that "entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions."52 While it could be 
difficult to justify trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA as being 
unavoidable, it would be easier to justify the trade measure as being 
the least GATT -inconsistent of various alternatives to achieving the 
environmental goal. This Panel also held that the "necessary" test 
must focus specifically upon the trade measure as opposed to the 
overall system.53 The EC Proposal supports the notion that 
"necessary" relate specifically to the trade measure and not the 
overall goal or policy.54 
Suggestions 
The EC recommends that "the trade measure applied should not be 
more restrictive than it is necessary to achieve a public policy goal 
48 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 45, para. 5.27. 
49 Section 337, supra note 12. 
50 Commentators note that assessment of the likelihood of success of GA TT -
consistent alternatives is subjective. See McDonald, supra note 26 at 435. For ex-
ample, if negotiated settlements are not working, how long must a contracting 
party pursue GA TT -consistent alternatives before trade measures are deemed 
necessary? 
5l Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 46, para 5.28. 
52 Section 337, supra note 12 at 60, para. 5.26. 
53 To rule otherwise would "permit contracting.parties to introduce GATT 
inconsistencies that are not necessary simply by making them part of a scheme 
which contained elements that are necessary." Ibid., para. 5.27. 
54 Ibid. 
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as encompassed in article XX."55 The problem is that the Proposal 
does not specify what standard is intended for judging what is 
necessary. Does the test require that the trade actions were unavoid-
able, since all other options were exhausted, or that the trade actions 
impose the least-degree of GATT-inconsistency? 
It is submitted that the least-degree of GATT-inconsistency test 
would be the most effective because it is inappropriate to ask a 
large group of nations whether their mutually agreed upon MEA is an 
unavoidable measure.56 Likewise, if the nations have assembled and 
put their collective minds to addressing an international environ-
mental issue, it is quite likely that all other feasible options were 
exhausted. If nations had other options that involved less effort than 
negotiating and implementing an MEA, while imposing no worse 
trade effects, then those options would likely have been pursued. 
The essence of GATT members' concerns revolve around pro-
tectionist trade policies. As the EC Proposal states, "the fact that 
such [trade] measures have been discussed and agreed multilaterally 
is the best guarantee against the risk of protectionist abuses or that 
unnecessary trade restrictions will be introduced" [emphasis 
added].57 
The evaluation of "necessity" would be improved if the chal-
lenged trade measure could be interpreted in light of the urgency of 
the international environmental objective. For example, if time is 
of the essence in a particular environmental emergency, it would 
seem logical that more extreme trade measures would be appropri-
ate, despite the fact that the general environmental objective could 
be pursued, less effectively and less quickly, by less trade restrictive 
measures. 
There are other problems regarding the standards to be used by 
GATT Panels in assessing the "necessity" of trade actions. For ex-
ample, should scientific studies be conducted to provide evidence 
that the trade measure pursued was necessary and unavoidable rela-
tive to the other options? What weight will such studies be given? 
55 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5. 
56 If a group of nations decide to make a particular environmental objective a 
priority and create an MEA to achieve that goal, then a GAIT Panel would proba-
bly consider the resulting MEA to be a necessary measure. However, the resulting 
MEA may not be unavoidable as there is always the option of the nations not 
taking any action to address the issue. 
57 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5. 
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Should an independent collaboration be required of such studies. 
Could one trade measure be deemed necessary merely because 
studies show that alternative trade measures would be too inconve-
nient or costly to administer? 
PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) 
Some GATT provisions require that like products be treated alike, 
regardless of where they were made and how they were made. 
Although PPMs do not directly relate to article XX, they are ex-
tremely relevant to environmental and conservation measures. 
The Tuna-Dolphin decision established that the relevant GATT 
provisions only involved "those measures that are applied to the 
product as such."58 Regulations distinguishing products on any other 
basis than the physical characteristics of the product itself, were 
found to be inconsistent with the "like product" provisions.59 The 
PPMs, involving the rate at which dolphins were injured or killed by 
boats fishing for tuna, did not affect tuna as a product. 
The Panel established that article XX can only be applied to the 
product facing the trade restriction, not to the circumstances under 
which the product was produced or harvested. The Panel held that 
the regulations aimed at protecting dolphins, 
could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products 
as such because they would not directly regulate the sale 
of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product. 60 
Exceptions must be made for PPMs, however, because measures 
taken against supposedly environmentally-friendly products that are 
produced in an environmentally unfriendly manner, will otherwise 
be GATT-inconsistent. For example, the potential ban on products 
produced with but not containing ozone-depleting substances under 
the Montreal Protocol would likely be declared GA TT-
inconsistent. 
58 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 41, para. 5.14. 
59 The Tuna-Dolphin Panel found that the U.S. import prohibition could not 
be considered an internal regulation under art. III because it concerned the 
process of tuna harvesting instead of tuna as a product. See Tuna-Dolphin, supra 
note 34 at 39-42, para. 5.8-5.16. 
60 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 41, para. 5.14. 
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The EC proposal would allow trade restrictions under article XX 
based on production processes "under certain circumstances."61 
These circumstances would include consideration of whether other 
members of the MEA are applying such controls on production, or 
whether other forms of trade control are insufficient to achieve the 
goals of the MEA.62 
Suggestions 
The EC Proposal represents significant progress in acknowledging 
the need for MEAs to effect change in the PPMs of various products. 
The GATT contracting parties should adopt this provision in order 
to support MEAs that tackle environmentally hazardous PPMs. After 
all, at one level, product distinction based upon PPMs already ex-
ists. Many companies are realizing that their sales may be boosted 
by advertising or labelling their environmentally-safe production 
processes. Why would the international trade regime want to deny 
this trend? A nation's trade policies ought to be able to reflect the 
PPM policy-choices that the country has made. It should be possible 
to incorporate limited PPM-based exceptions into article XX 
without opening the floodgates to protectionism. 
The EC Proposal must clarify the circumstances in which PPMs 
will qualify as article XX exceptions. A good approach would be to 
expand the definition of "product" to encompass the life cycle of 
the product.63 This would imply that products which only differ in 
the environmental effects of their PPMs would not be like products. 
Such distinctions between products would not be unduly bur-
densome, but would allow trading partners to pursue and enforce 
PPM-policies under MEAs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is recommended that GATT contracting parties help facilitate 
the creation and effective operation of MEAs, by establishing clear, 
flexible criteria upon which trade sanctions used to enforce MEAs 
will not be frustrated under GATT. Specifically, MEAs ought not to 
6I "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5. 
62 Ibid. 
63 R. Housman & D. Zaelke "Trade, Environment, and Sustainable 
Development: A Primer" (1992) 15 Hastings Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 535 at 605. 
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be restricted by the extrajurisdictionality test that has arisen from 
GATT Panel decisions: MEAs are international in scope and often in-
volve environmental concerns that are not limited to one confined 
territory. The EC Proposal must acknowledge the manner in which 
an extrajurisdictionality test could suppress MEA development. The 
necessary test ought to incorporate the standard of least-degree of 
GATT inconsistency, in preference to other standards that have been 
used which require that the trade action was unavoidable, or resulted 
from the exhaustion of all other options. Process and production 
methods ought to be incorporated into the collective interpretation. 
The EC Proposal represents great progress in this area. The 
circumstances under which PPMs are excepted will have to be 
specified. A suggested starting point is the consideration of the 
life-cycle of a product. 
